REMARKS

Claims 166-185 are pending in the application. Claims 166-185 currently stand rejected. The Applicant respectfully requests consideration of the following remarks and allowance of the claims.

35 U.S.C. § 102 Rejection

Claims 166-167, 169-172, 176-177, and 179-182 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,687,241 (hereinafter "Goss"). The Applicant respectfully traverses the rejection for at least the following reasons.

Gross fails to teach that a cookie included in a voice call *originating* from a user device is processed to route the voice call from the user device to a first call center resource, as is taught by claim 166.

Rather, Gross teaches that a web server maintains a session with a customer web browser over the Internet using cookies or other session maintenance technology so that the web server can identify the customer for the purposes of matching a call-back request to a qualified agent and keeping track of the requesting customer (see final OA, p. 14; Goss col. 7, lines 62-67). Even if the call-back request includes a cookie, once the cookie is used to match the request to an agent, the agent then calls the customer back using any form of communication, such as by placing a telephone call to a number provided by the customer (see Goss, Abstract). In other words, the call-back request is not a voice call itself but, instead, is merely a request for a call to be placed back to the customer by the agent. Therefore, cookies as taught by Goss are used to request a call originating from the agent (first call center resource) back to the customer (user device), not to route a voice call originating from a user device to a first call center resource, as provided by claim 166.

Based on the foregoing comments, the Applicant contends that claim 166 is allowable in view of the cited reference, and such indication is respectfully requested. Independent claim 176 contains limitations similar to those of claim 166, and is therefore allowable over the art of record for at least the same reasons as claim 166.

Claim 167, similar to claim 166, generating a second routing instruction indicating a second route for the voice call *originating* from the user device to the second call center resource. Goss does not teach these limitations.

Instead, as stated in the arguments above, any voice call made in Goss is place from an agent to a customer in response to the customer requesting a call via a web site (see Goss, Abstract). Therefore, even if Goss teaches transferring the call to a different agent as asserted by the final Office action (see final OA, p.16), the transferred call still originated from the original agent and not from the user device, as provided by claim 1.

Based on the foregoing comments, the Applicant contends that claim 167 is allowable in view of the cited reference, and such indication is respectfully requested. Dependent claim 177 contains limitations similar to those of claim 167, and is therefore allowable over the art of record for at least the same reasons as claim 167.

35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection

Claims 168 and 178 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being upatentable over Goss in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,836,476 (hereinafter "Dunn"). The Applicant respectfully traverses the rejection for at least the following reasons.

Claim 168 requires that the voice call comprise a Get Document request in Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The final Office action admits that Goss fails to teach these limitations (Office action, p. 8, third paragraph). Dunn is provided as teaching these aspects.

However, the final Office action misinterprets the limitations of claim 168. Specifically, the Applicant respectfully points out that, as is well known in the art, a Get request is a specific type of request that is *explicitly included in the parameters HTTP*. Other examples of requests in HTTP include Head, Post, Delete, and Put, among others. Accordingly, claim 168 provides that the voice call is a Get Document request in HTTP.

In contrast, as acknowledged by the final OA, Dunn merely discloses using VoIP to request service from a drug store, including ordering a prescription and getting directions (see final OA, p. 16). Dunn does not teach at any point that a Get Document request of HTTP is used for any purpose. Therefore, Dunn fails to overcome the deficiencies of Goss regarding the limitations of claim 168.

Based on the foregoing comments, the Applicant contends that claim 168 is allowable in view of the cited reference, and such indication is respectfully requested. Dependent claim 178 contains limitations similar to those of claim 168, and is therefore allowable over the art of record for at least the same reasons as claim 168.

While separately allowable over the art of record, the remaining dependent claims depend from otherwise allowable independent claims. The Applicant therefore refrains from a discussion of the remaining dependent claims for the sake of brevity.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above remarks, the Applicant submits that the claims are allowable.

The Applicant believes no fees are due with respect to this filing. However, should the Office determine fees are necessary, the Office is authorized to charge Deposit Account No. 21-0765 accordingly.

Respectfully submitted,

/Brian L. Arment/

SIGNATURE OF PRACTITIONER

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